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This thesis is on the passing of Right to Work (RTW) laws in Georgia. It tracks public debate 
surrounding the passing of Senate bills 10 and 11 in 1947. This thesis examines who was arguing 
for and against the bills in public forums, mainly in the Atlanta Constitution newspaper and how 
these bills came to pass. Existing scholarship focusing on the Taft-Hartley Act and RTW laws 
seemingly overlook the fact that Georgia’s RTW laws were passed months before the Taft-Hartley 
Act was enacted. Most of the challenges to Georgia’s RTW laws pointed out the laws were 
contradicted the Wagner Act, the key labor law passed by Congress in 1935. This thesis follows 
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations who opposed 
Georgia’s RTW laws. This thesis also argues that Georgia’s RTW laws paved the way for the 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 In March of 1947, Governor Herman Talmadge made Georgia a so-called Right to Work 
(RTW) state by passing legislation dubbed “Right to Work” laws.1 Georgia was not the first RTW 
state; Florida was the first such legislation in 1943.2 Georgia, however, is a unique case because 
of the complex events surrounding the enactment of the law. Interestingly, a string of other 
states also became Right to Work states around the same time. For example, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Iowa, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia had 
enacted RTW statutes in 1947.3  
This thesis focuses on the political wrangling that led up to the creation of Georgia’s RTW 
laws and examines the public discourse surrounding RTW laws in general. The premise is state 
RTW laws, created following the Second World War, provided Right-leaning lawmakers an 
opportunity to pass the Taft-Hartley Act despite Truman’s presidential veto in 1948. The Taft-
Hartley Act, also known as the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, is federal legislation 
that restricts the activities and power of labor unions. Evidence supporting the premise of this 
work is traced through the anti-union rhetoric in published articles in the Georgia newspaper, 
The Atlanta Constitution; anti-union propaganda efforts run by pro-business organizations; and 
the unions’ response to RTW laws. I then evaluate the role that Right to Work legislation played 
in creating the Taft-Hartley Act and demonstrate that there is more to the story of the 
curtailment of American labor union rights than just the Taft-Hartley Act. Further, this thesis 
 
1 Journal of the Senate of the State of Georgia at the regular session of the General Assembly commenced at 
Atlanta, Monday January 13, 1947, by the Georgia General Assembly. UGA Call# GA L402 1947. Page 70. 
2 “Right-to-Work States,” National Conference of State Legislatures, accessed May th, 2021, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx. 





examines the short-term and long-term impacts of RTW laws on union membership and what, if 
anything, can be done to reverse the effects of anti-union laws.  
 Researching the Taft-Hartley Act and its impact on labor unions is hardly a novel exercise; 
however, few researchers have included state-level Right to Work laws in their research on the 
United States labor movement. To date, most of the research has focused on the Taft-Hartley Act 
and its impacts. International Labor Review, an academic journal covering labor history, 
dedicated an entire issue to studying the Taft-Hartley Act in 1958. Academics such as Philip Taft, 
Clyde W. Summers, and Joseph Shister wrote articles entitled “Internal Affairs of Unions and the 
Taft-Hartley Act,” “Summary Evaluation of the Taft-Hartley Act,” and “The Impact of the Taft-
Hartley Act on Union Strength and Collective Bargaining,” respectively.4 However, few articles in 
this special edition mentioned the state-level Right to Work laws in reference to the historic 
federal legislation that followed them. This thesis seeks to help construct a bridge between the 
local Right to Work laws and demonstrate the direct connection the Taft-Hartley Act has to 
Georgia’s RTW laws.  
 Historians have discussed the Taft-Hartley Act outside of academic journals and political 
events surrounding the federal legislation. Works such as Nancy MacLean’s Democracy in Chains: 
The Deep History of The Radical Right s Stealth Plan for America , Elizabeth Fones-Wolf’s 
Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism 1945-60 (1995), Kim Phillips-
Fein’s Invisible Hands: The Businessmen's Crusade Against the New Deal (2010) discuss the 
 
4 Taft, Philip. . “Internal Affairs of Unions and the Taft-Hartley Act.” ILR Review  : 352-59; Summers, Clyde 
W. . “A Summary Evaluation of the Taft-Hartley Act.” ILR Review  : 
405– ; Shister, Joseph. . “The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on Union Strength and Collective 




intricate web of political dealings that sparked pro-business legislation. In these books, while 
there is a discussion of the Taft-Hartley Act, the authors barely mention the RTW laws. There is 
no doubt that the authors knew of the RTW laws; however, a deep discussion of the RTW laws 
fell outside the scope of these books. This thesis aims to remedy this omission by casting a 
spotlight on state labor laws in the evolution of labor unions and workers’ rights in the United 
States. 
 This thesis argues that the Taft-Hartley Act, which is federal legislation, would not exist 
without the support provided from pre-existing state-level Right to Work laws. This thesis will 
demonstrate this by examining the unsuccessful challenges to local Right to Work laws and the 
public discourse surrounding them. To understand this co-dependency, an examination of these 
two sets of laws is necessary. The Taft-Hartley Act officially ended certain practices, such as 
requiring all employees to be union members in good standing, commonly known as a closed-
shop union. The Act also banned “secondary boycotts,” in which unions picketed a company that 
did business with another company that the union was on strike against. Along with banning 
foremen from unionizing, the federal legislation required unions to provide  days’ notice 
before beginning a strike, placed restrictions on unions’ political contributions, mandated union 
members to sign non-Communist affiliation affidavits, and outlawed many forms of strikes, such 
as wildcat strikes and secondary boycotts.5 Most importantly, the Taft-Hartley Act permitted 
states to create their own Right to Work laws which served to provide legal cover for these state 
level laws which had not been tested in superior courts yet.6  
 
5 Act of June 23,  “Taft-Hartley Act” , Public Law -1-1, HR 3020-36. 
6 Act of June ,  “Taft-Hartley Act” , Public Law -1-1, HR 3020- ; “Anti-Labor Laws Spurn CIO-Gilman,  




1.1 Purpose of Study 
 State RTW laws are more granular than the federal legislation and vary from one state to 
the next. In this case, Georgia’s RTW laws is utilized to illustrate how state-level RTW laws differ 
from the Taft-Hartley Act. Some distinguishing features of Georgia’s RTW law included banning 
mass picketing, prohibiting unions from using “intimidation, violence or threats” to persuade  a 
worker to continue employment or join a labor union, and blocking secondary strikes.7 While 
most of these conditions seem similar to the Taft-Hartley Act’s provisions, Georgia introduced its 
RTW legislation in January 1947. The Governor swiftly signed it into law in March of the same 
year.8 In contrast, the Taft-Hartley Act was not passed until June of 1947, three months after 
Georgia’s Governor signed RTW laws.9  
 Given that some states, like Georgia, adopted RTW laws before the institution of the Taft-
Hartley Act, there were obvious constitutional questions. The predominant Constitutional 
principle at issue was National Supremacy, meaning that when state law conflicts with federal 
law, federal law trumps the state law. In this case, labor unions argued that Georgia’s RTW law 
contradicted the existing federal law, which at the time was the Wagner Act. The Wagner Act, 
also known as the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, guaranteed the right of employees to 
organize in trade unions, collectively bargain, and strike. To negate those questions of 
constitutionality, pro-business organizations and Republican lawmakers teamed up to protect 
corporate interests and to defend the existing RTW laws. Republican lawmakers and business 
 
Future of American Labor. Anchor Books, New York, . ; “Taft-Hartley Act Overview,” FindLaw, accessed 
June 3rd, https://employment.findlaw.com/wages-and-benefits/taft-hartley-act-overview.html. 
7 Journal of the Senate of the State of Georgia at the regular session of the General Assembly commenced at 
Atlanta, Monday January 13, 1947, by the Georgia General Assembly. UGA Call# GA L402 1947. Page 70. 
8 “Closed Shop, Check-off, Picketing Banned as Talmadge Signs Bills,” Atlanta Constitution, March 15, 1947. 




leaders created the Taft-Hartley Act to rewrite national labor law. The research presented here 
fills the gap in the works of labor history on this topic that labor historians often overlook. This 
work not only examines the chain of events from local RTW laws to the establishment of the Taft-
Hartley Act, but it also uncovers the contentious political atmosphere between businesses and 
labor unions that made it possible for pro-businesses groups to pitch RTW laws to the working 
class.  
 The Taft-Hartley Act and the rise of state RTW laws did not occur in a vacuum. For a 
complete view of the history of RTW laws and the progression towards the Taft-Hartley Act, one 
can look at the labor movement in the 1930s and early 1940s. Before the Taft-Hartley Act, 
organized labor had won critical rights through brutally fought battles with businesses. One of 
the most significant labor union conflicts took place during 1936-1937. Arguably one of the most 
critical labor conflicts of the twentieth century, the Flint, Michigan sit-down strike of General 
Motors, helped to establish firm labor union roots in the automotive industry and solidified the 
United Auto Workers (UAW) union as a powerful force at the bargaining table.10 The UAW were 
able to launch such a staunch offensive on General Motors’ plants because of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, also known as the 
Wagner Act.11 In addition to the employees’ rights established in the Wagner Act, the National 
Industrial Recovery Act authorized the United States’ president to regulate industries regarding 
their payment of fair wages to employees and reasonable prices to consumers. With the Federal 
government protecting the right to organize, prospective new union members could worry less 
 
10 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up, 92. 




about the Pinkerton Detective Agency’s spies or GM agents infiltrating union leadership.12 
However, General Motors’ union-busting efforts were so successful that auto-union membership 
in Flint, Michigan, was decimated in the span of only two years.13 
 By 1936, the conflict over labor came to a head when GM rejected the UAW’s persistent 
requests to sit down at the bargaining table to discuss wages and line speed.14 Instead of sitting 
down at the bargaining table, workers at the Fisher Body No. 2 plant sat down on the job to halt 
production.15 American business leaders fiercely opposed the workers' efforts stating that if 
workers “can seize premises illegally, hold them  indefinitely, refuse admittance to owners or 
managers… and threaten bloodshed in  all attempts to dislodge them…then freedom and liberty 
are at an end, government becomes a mockery, superseded by anarchy, mob rule and ruthless 
dictatorship.”16 With businesses leadership calling this strike “mob rule,” it is no wonder that 
similar rhetoric later influenced anti-union propaganda writers to dismantle unions altogether.17 
Regardless of the propaganda, business leaders needed swift action to end the illegal strike. They 
sought out remedy with State Circuit Court Judge Edward D. Black to order the striking workers 
to leave the building. The ruling was a proverbial “punch in the gut” for the union workers, 
especially since union lawyers discovered that Judge Black owned approximately $219,900 in GM 
stock.18 However, after making this discovery, the ruling was thrown out and the case transferred 
to another judge.19 Eventually, the police and the National Guard were called in by the state’s 
 
12 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up, 81. 
13 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up, 81. 
14 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up, 84.  
15 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up, 84. 
16 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up, 86. 
17 Pegler, Westbrook, “What Sort of Labor Law? None at All,” Atlanta Constitution, March 7, 1949. 
18 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up. 86.  




governor to dissuade the strikers from continuing the disruption of the flow of labor.20 GM finally 
brought an end to the strike by promising not to retaliate against any worker who participated in 
the strike, agreeing not to interfere with UAW’s organizational efforts, and agreeing to a  
wage increase that GM insisted was just a response to wage hikes at Chrysler.21 
 The UAW then launched its war with GM. GM retaliated against the strikers in any way it 
could. For example, GM attempted to freeze the strikers out of the building by turning off the 
heat in the middle of a Michigan winter; invited the police in to tear gas the strikers; and moved 
car parts onto railcars, thereby moving production out of the plant and nullify the workers’ 
strike.22 The strikers were undaunted by GM’s efforts. Strikers fought back by throwing anything 
they could find at police and barricading the gates to keep advancing police out of the plant. 
 Further adding to business leaders’ worry over the ever-strengthening unions, the GM sit-
down inspired a tsunami of other sit-downs and strikes across the county. Around five million 
workers participated in the strikes nationwide and nearly three million more workers joined 
unions in 1937.23 The labor battles of the 1930s empowered employees to unionize and organize 
against the auto industry, causing companies such as GM to succumb to the labor movement's 
power. The empowerment of labor inspired an even more substantial labor effort into the early 
1940s, solidifying unions as a critical pillar of the American war machine leading into World War 
II. 
 
20 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up. 87. 
21 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up. 92. 
22 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up. 85; 87. 




 Unions experienced massive growth in the early part of the 1940s. Membership went 
from 8.7 million in 1940 to a whopping 14.3 million in 1945. Given the United States’ involvement 
in World War II, employers did very little to impede unionization efforts.24 During World War II, 
laborers stopped working 48 hour work weeks and began working only 40 hours per week and 
even agreed to no-strike clauses.25 Workers also began demanding higher wages due to the 
smaller paychecks resulting from the reduced number of hours worked.26 During union 
bargaining of the 1940s, many business leaders, Republican politicians, and editorial writers 
began to denounce unions for their selfishness in the demands for steep pay increases.27 Given 
the recent decade of strikes, they had a history to point to when speaking out against the unions. 
In 1946, one year before Georgia’s RTW laws and the Taft-Hartley Act, there were 4,985 strikes 
involving around 4.6 million workers that took place in the United States.28 Businesses suffered 
a black eye across the board from striking workers seeking increases in wages or decreases in 
working hours and the frustration that came from the no-strike clauses. Business leaders knew 
something needed to change, but they were running low on options short of attempting to 
assassinate labor leaders.29   
 When businesses usual methods of clogging unionization efforts began to fail, they turned 
to a new strategy. The pro-business Right pushed a “Had Enough” platform when it came to labor 
stoppages from strikes.30 Given the massive number of strikes that had taken, the message was 
 
24 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up. 94. 
25 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up. 94. 
26 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up. 95. 
27 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up. 99. 
28 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up. 100. 
29 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up. 102. 




well-received, netting the GOP control of both the House and Senate in 1946.31 In response to 
the pro-union Wagner Act, which passed more than a decade previously, several states, 
particularly in the South, began to pass RTW laws to stall unionization efforts. These RTW laws 
kept union membership down, profits up, and attracted more businesses to these states as they 
could pay lower wages and take-home greater profits. RTW laws were met with staunch union 
opposition and challenges to their constitutionality. To protect the businesses’ interests in these 
states, Republican lawmakers pushed through the Taft-Hartley Act to shore up the legal defenses 
for state RTW laws. This strategy proved effective as RTW laws are still in effect.   
 During the 1930s and 1940s, several right-wing think tanks and pro-business 
organizations formed to combat the New Deal era style of governance that allowed unions to 
flourish. In 1932 a General Motors executive helped create the American Liberty League, an 
organization to “combat radicalism, preserve property rights, uphold and preserve the 
Constitution.”32 Three years after being founded, the organization would be funded almost 
exclusively by wealthy business leaders.33 Organizations, such as the National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM), launched massive public relations campaigns to market the idea of 
unchecked freedom for business to the American worker. In 1937 NAM spent over half of its 
income, roughly 1.5 million dollars, on its public relations (PR) efforts to combat the rising union 
militancy.34 There are many examples of pro-business organizations fighting unionization efforts 
during this time, such as the Chamber of Commerce or the Foundation for Economic Education.35 
 
31 Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up. 103. 
32 Phillips-Fein, Kim, Invisible Hands  The Businessmen s Crusade Against the New Deal, (New York: Norton), 2009, 
10. 
33 Phillips-Fein, Kim, Invisible Hands, 12. 
34 Phillips-Fein, Kim, Invisible Hands, 14. 




However, all of these organizations utilized similar anti-union propaganda tactics. The success of 
these organizations would be instrumental in the creation of RTW legislation and the eventual 
creation of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
1.2 Labor and Management 
 The unions that are the most present in the fight for Georgia against the RTW laws and 
the subsequent Taft-Hartley Act were the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Within these unions, one man stands out as leading the charge 
against the RTW laws. George Googe, Southern Director of the AFL, sensed a storm on the 
horizon in the world of labor law in 1947.36 As soon as the RTW laws passed in Georgia, Googe 
believed that, “The Georgia bills were  part of a plot to push through such measures wherever 
possible, and thereby influence Congress to mutilate the Wagner Act.”37 Googe provided a critical 
understanding into the long conflict between labor and Capita as an insightful participant during 
those early years of union formation. Googe was replaced by J. L. Rhodes who took over as the 
Southern Director in December of 1948.38  
 On the other side of this union battle for labor were the business classes that encouraged 
Republican lawmakers, Senator Robert Taft and Representative Fred A. Hartley, Jr., to create the 
Taft-Hartley Act. As the bill passed the House on April 17, 1947, it was, without a doubt, 
influenced by the string of local RTW laws.39 Further, in covering Georgia’s RTW law, the Atlanta 
 
36 Furniss, Jim, “Georgia CIO, AFL Join Forces To Fight ‘Anti-Labor’ Legislation, Atlanta Constitution, February 12, 
1947. 
37 Furniss, Jim, “Georgia CIO, AFL Join Forces To Fight ‘Anti-Labor’ Legislation, Atlanta Constitution, February 12, 
1947. 
38 Little, Jim, “Rhodes Takes Over Dixie AFL Helm,” Atlanta Constitution, December 20, 1948. 




Constitution newspaper shows how prominent members of the local press aligned themselves 
with the pro-business camp. Journalists Westbrook Pegler and Ralph McGill wrote articles 
entitled “The Labor Unions and Fascism,” and “The Commies--- At Work and Play,” respectively.40 
Pegler spent most of his career writing articles and speaking out about corruption within labor 
unions, going so far as to denounce the unions as causing the “worst series of riots and lynchings 
in the life of our country;” he also advocated joining the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) as a means to defend 
one’s community from unions.41 Pegler eventually left the Atlanta Constitution newspaper to 
write for the John Birch Society’s magazine, another Right-wing, pro-business organization 
combating labor unions.42 The Atlanta Constitution newspaper was also home to some moderate 
voices on the labor movement, such as Thomas L. Stokes. Stokes did not advocate to return the 
means of production to the worker. Instead, he reported on the labor movement without 
accusations of radically charged words as Pegler had done. Regardless of their position on the 
labor movement, these men’s writings made their way into the hands of the many people who 
read the Atlanta Constitution newspaper in the 1940s, likely coloring the local public’s views on 
unions. This stream of anti-union articles helped pro-business interests better sanitize their 
message for those on the fence about unions while also cementing the opinions of those whose 
minds were already made up against organized labor.  
 The remainder of this thesis is composed of three chapters. Chapter 2 covers the year 
1947 and the initial establishment of the RTW laws in Georgia through Senate Bills (SB) 10 and 
 
40 Pegler, Westbrook, “The Labor Unions and Fascism,” Atlanta Constitution, August , ; McGill, Ralph, “The 
Commies--- At Work and Play,” Atlanta Constitution, June 4, 1948. 
41 Pegler, Westbrook, “The Labor Unions and Fascism,” Atlanta Constitution, August 25, 1949; Pegler, Westbrook, 
“What Sort of Labor Law? None at ALL,” Atlanta Constitution, March 7, 1949. 




11, and the initial response from Unions. Chapter 3 picks up in 1948 with unions’ legal battles 
against the states’ RTW laws and the Taft-Hartley Act. This chapter analyzes events surrounding 
the fight against state RTW laws and the Taft-Hartley Act using the historical theory of Strategies 
and Tactics developed by the French Jesuit and scholar Michel de Certeau. Chapter 4 summarizes 
the work while also briefly examining where the labor movement has gone since RTW laws 
became a reality. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the future of unions in the form of 
The Protection of the Right to Organize (PRO) Act (2021). The (PRO) Act is a labor law and civil 
rights bill that was passed by members of the US House of Representatives on March 9, 2021, by 
a nearly strict partisan vote, 225 Democrats voting for it while 206 Republicans voted against it.43 
  
 





2 HISTORY OF GEORGIA S RTW LAWS 
 Georgia became a RTW state when the labor movement’s power in the South was 
challenged by the business community. Union organizers and activists quickly responded to 
mobilize against the RTW laws in Georgia. At the same time, the American businesses 
community, or what Karl Marx referred to as the bourgeois class, engaged in a propaganda war 
to combat perceived union dominance. According to the Atlanta Constitution, Atlanta, Georgia’s 
primary daily newspaper, Georgia boasted some 325,000 union members in 1948 who were 
ready to vote in more substantial numbers than was usual.44 As impressive as these membership 
numbers are, unions across the United States were in for the fight of their lives in the form of 
brand new laws banning closed shop unions, voluntary check-off methods of collecting dues, and 
the practice of mass picketing.45 These new laws, commonly referred to as Right to Work (RTW) 
laws, were passed in states across the South as American businesses began to fuel their 
propaganda machines to push back against the New Deal policies that supported unions.46 
 Given the long offensive against the New Deal and organized labor, it is no wonder to see 
so many members of the press fall in line with pro-business propaganda. After all, considering 
how well-funded organizations such as American Freedom League, the Foundation for Economic 
Education, and other Right-leaning, pro-capitalist organizations were, it is no surprise that their 
influence is present in journalists' writing.47 Even critically acclaimed writers, such as Pulitzer 
 
44 Jim Furniss, “Georgia Labor Vote Seen Largest Ever,” Atlanta Constitution, June 6, 1948. 
45 “Labor Protest Looms on Newly-Passed Laws,” Atlanta Constitution, March 27, 1947. 
46 Phillips-Fein, Kim. Invisible Hands  The Businessmen s Crusade Against the New Deal (New York: Norton), 2009. 
11. 




Prize winner Ralph McGill, equated unions and union bosses to Communists. According to McGill, 
union members were “liars by oath, and traitors to the United States of America.”48 
 Labor unions in Georgia had to contend with an onslaught from the state's Governor, local 
lawmakers, the National Farm Bureau, and a national drive to gut the Wagner Act. Even at the 
height of their power, unions' survival of this onslaught of attacks was a tall order. The unions 
attempted everything from educational outreach to legal challenges that bore no fruit.49 The 
unions could not match the deadliest weapon these Right-leaning organizations and lawmakers 
had in their arsenal, the RTW laws. 
2.1 Senate Bill 10 & 11 
 Georgia Senate Bills (S.B.) 10 and 11 were first introduced into the state Senate by the 
chairman of the Industrial Relations Committee, Senator Robert Grahm Daniell Sr. of the 49th 
District of Georgia, on Wednesday, January 22nd, 1947.50  S.B. 10 ended the practice of closed 
shop unions in Georgia, and S.B. 11 banned mass picketing to block unions from cutting into 
business profits during a strike.51 These two laws became known as the RTW laws that would 
stunt union growth and power in Georgia, while paving the way for future national labor 
legislation that became known as the Taft-Hartley Act. Georgia RTW laws were a promise kept 
by Georgia Governor Herman Talmadge. In his first address to the Georgia General Assembly, 
Governor Talmadge stated: 
 
48 Ralph McGill, “The Commies- - - At Work and Play,” Atlanta Constitution, June 4, 1948. 
49 “Keeping Up With Atlanta”, Atlanta Constitution, February 7, 1948. 
50 Journal of the Senate of the State of Georgia at the regular session of the General Assembly commenced at 
Atlanta, Monday January 13, 1947, by the Georgia General Assembly. UGA Call# GA L402 1947. Page 70. 




 It is the duty of you and me to encourage the cooperation of labor and management giving 
equal protection of the laws. Men who work must have the security of a home and the pleasure 
of decent living conditions, and such security as life in a democratic state affords. Opportunity to 
advance in job classifications, in salaries, and in wages must not be impaired and social reforms 
must be protected and maintained. Labor has every right to organize and bargain collectively. 
That right was granted capital when the first corporation in America was chartered. Labor has no 
less a right and it is the function of good government to protect each.52  
 
Although seemingly in support of union activity, this statement contradicts Governor Talmadge’s 
actions in March when he signed the RTW laws.53  
 One is left to interpret his words through the lens of a more Right-leaning pro-capitalist 
viewpoint. Through this interpretation, the “cooperation of labor” that Governor Talmadge 
favored was less cooperation and more coercion. Talmadge wanted these new labor laws 
enacted so that instead of management meeting laborers’ demands under threat of a strike, the 
workers would have less power during collective bargaining. The public would not get an official 
reasoning for Talmadge passing the Georgia RTW laws as he never commented during the signing 
of these impactful bills.54 
 Labor organizations did not take the signing of these bills lightly. Almost immediately after 
the signing of the bills into law, labor organizations were preparing for a lengthy legal battle to 
 
52 Journal of the Senate of the State of Georgia, 65. 
53 “Closed Shop, Check-off, Picketing Banned as Talmadge Signs Bills,” Atlanta Constitution, March 15, 1947. 




ensure the laws were repealed or ruled unconstitutional.55 Labor organizations argued that these 
rights were engrained in the New Deal model of labor relations and that changing them without 
changing national laws were in direct violation of the Wagner Act.56 T. M. Forbes, the Executive 
Vice President of the Cotton Manufacturers Association of Georgia, made a statement to the 
press that, “Georgia workers, as well as all employers, should be pleased over Governor 
Talmadge’s approval of the RTW laws  … These laws are not punitive laws. They are corrective 
laws. They are not anti-labor. They are anti-union monopoly.”57 
 While it would be wonderful if the Georgia RTW laws were a localized cancer that could 
be eradicated, this is was not the case. RTW legislation subsequently spread throughout the 
country, with several other states becoming anti-union RTW states. (Even Michigan could not 
withstand the massive political influence and money wielded by pro-business individuals in 
2012.) The issue rose all the way to the federal level with the chairs of the Labor Committee in 
the House and the Senate. Representative Fred A. Hartley of New Jersey and Senator Howard 
Taft of Ohio, famed authors of the Taft-Hartley Bill, indicated earlier in the year that the House 
would move expeditiously and without delay on introducing new changes to existing labor laws.58 
Without these men working diligently to saw the labor movement in half by passing the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947, also known as the Taft-Hartley Act, the AFL and CIO's legal 
challenges might have succeeded in court. However, as the Taft-Hartley Act would eventually go 
into effect on June 23rd of 1947, any attempt to challenge state-level RTW laws would be difficult 
 
55 “Closed Shop, Check-off, Picketing Banned,” Atlanta Constitution, March 15, 1947. 
56 “Closed Shop, Check-off, Picketing Banned,” Atlanta Constitution, March 15, 1947. 
57 “Closed Shop, Check-off, Picketing Banned as Talmadge Signs Bills,” Atlanta Constitution, March 15, 1947. 




to carry out now that federal laws backed them up. RTW laws and the Taft-Hartley Act have been 
bound to one another to this day. Without the state RTW laws already in existence, it is likely 
that the Taft-Hartley Act would not have had the public support to pass. At the same time, 
without the backing from a federal law, there was no clear evidence that state-level RTW laws 
had the authority to ban union shops. 
 State RTW laws had a devastating impact on unions’ strength and its perceived "mob 
rule." Union mob rule, however, was not the norm. In states that did not have RTW laws, such as 
Wisconsin, unions had been losing big fights against management. In March of , the CIO’s 
United Automobile Workers (UAW) voted to end a 327-day strike and return to work with no 
wage increase or any concession from management.59 It was a total and complete defeat for the 
UAW; and yet, members of the press wrote that racketeers ran communist unions to enrich 
themselves at the expense of the worker.60   
 The simple fact is that unions were not these political juggernauts that the press and anti-
union politicians attempted to make them out to be. Nor were the union presidents some absurd 
Machiavellian puppeteer playing 4-D chess with worker’s paychecks. Unions were already 
beatable, as evidenced in Wisconsin when union workers voted to return to work without a 
contract.61 Unions could also be intimidated by the threat of Congressional investigation into 
alleged Communist affiliations.62  The general public was also not supportive of union strikes. 
According to a Gallup poll taken in 1947, 58% of respondents said that laws should be passed to 
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forbid public service industries (such as electric, gas, telephone, and local transportation 
companies) from striking -- only 30% of respondents indicated there should be no such laws.63 
The same poll also asked whether government employees should have the right to strike. A 
shocking 69  of responders said “no,” while only  of respondents supported such a right.64 
While there are of course questions surrounding the data pool, such as what was the sample size 
and who were the individuals surveyed, public opinion on the right to strike is worth noting here 
as the public was also being persuaded by notoriously anti-union members of the press. 
 A very likely source of this public frustration with strikes is the unparalleled wave of strikes 
that took place across the country in 1946.65 However, there were also highly active propaganda 
campaigns run by the Chambers of Commerce in alliance with groups such as the American 
Legion, which sought to undermine public opinion in the labor movement generally and in unions 
specifically.66 These same conservative groups would eventually back the Taft-Hartley Act, for 
which the RTW laws helped lay the foundation. Right-leaning groups engaged in an intense 
lobbying campaign and spent millions of dollars taking out full-page ads in daily newspapers to 
shape public interest in favor of legislation that would further enrich the American bourgeoisie.67 
Given that the Taft-Hartley Act passed into law despite a presidential veto by one of the most 
pro-union presidents in American history, Truman, it is easy to see that the propaganda was 
highly effective.68   
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 The anti-union propaganda, however, did not exist in a vacuum by itself. Propaganda was 
also present in Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, Iowa, South Dakota, and Texas, where RTW 
laws were adopted in 1947.69 It should be noted that Arkansas, Florida, Arizona, and Nebraska all 
adopted RTW laws three years before this massive push to establish RTW laws around the United 
States. This widespread effort to combat unions became normalized to the point where federal 
lawmakers could push the Taft-Hartley Act into law with the federal government's full force and 
provided Senators cover while they went in opposition to a sitting president. 
 The unions did not roll over and accept defeat. The AFL and CIO put out scathing 
statements condemning the RTW laws and the Taft-Hartley Act while promising large labor 
education movements and the addition of new union members. 70  Several high-profile 
individuals spoke out against the RTW laws, such as James J. Reynolds. James Reynolds was a 
member of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) appointed by President Truman in August 
1947.71 As a member of the NLRB, Reynolds was a moderate voice on unions  rights. “Employers 
not only may talk about unions-they should but when an employer threatens his employees that 
if they join a union, he’ll shut down the plant, fire them or starve their wives and children,” 
Reynolds said, “he’s going beyond the law.”72 According to Reynolds, businesses and unions 
should bargain in good faith with each other. Shutting down a plant or a factory and moving them 
to a place where they can find cheaper labor was a practice that, unfortunately, was not 
something Reynolds could stop on his own and continues to this day. Even if he could end 
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predatory practices of businesses under capitalism, it wasn’t his perspective to do so. James 
Reynolds, much like many of these labor unions, were still working within the parameters of 
capitalism. Reynolds believed “that a free and self-disciplined labor movement is essential to the 
preservation of our free enterprise system.”73 
 While Reynolds was not the far left, anti-American Marxist that Westbrook Pegler or 
Ralph McGill would like their readers to believe, he was still standing in the way of the business 
conservatives’ plan to rip up the New Deal in favor of a more pro-business model. 74 This is the 
crux of the capitalist assault on the labor movement. If there is a roadblock preventing businesses 
from enriching themselves, management were willing to throw money at that problem until it 
went away. One way to do that was to encourage Congress to pass a new law to protect 
businesses from those problems. Kim Phillips-Fein, in her  book Invisible Hands: The 
Businessmen s Crusade Against the New Deal 2009), highlights this happening over and over 
again in the 1950s when businesses began funding think tanks to publish studies or promote 
arguments ranging from advocating for the destruction of the welfare state to the creation of 
union-busting consultants.75 The unions were just another problem which business owners threw 
money at to eliminate. The creation of RTW laws and the subsequent Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 
was a prime example of business leaders using their influence to smooth over opposition to the 
maximization of profits for management. 
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 Labor leaders in February of 1947, about a month after State Senator Robert Grahm 
Daniell, Sr. introduced S.B. 10 and 11 to the General Assembly, offered a grave warning to the 
State of Georgia when the Georgia Senate passed S.B. 10 and 11  by a vote of 41-1.76 Georgia’s 
CIO Director, Charles Gillman, was outspoken regarding S.B. 10 and 11 and in response to T.M. 
Forbes’s glowing endorsement of the RTW laws. Gillman said that “the bitterest fights we have 
had have been for management recognition of unions after a NLRB election has chosen them as 
bargaining agents for employees.”77 L.W. Flowers, of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, and 
George Googe, of the AFL, agreed that S.B. 10 and 11 were punitive and anti-labor and they both 
directly opposed Forbes’s high praise of the RTW.78 
 S.B. 10 and 11 received major support from the Georgia Farm Bureau Federation and its 
President, H. L. Wingate, who stated, “Talmadge wouldn’t veto the bills. He knows where his 
support comes from.”79 Wingate’s assertion was a seemingly ominous message that threatened 
to pull farmers' support from favoring Talmadge. The following year, labor leaders unanimously 
blamed H. L. Wingate and the Georgia Farm Bureau for the new RTW laws.80 To understand how 
serious this threat was, one must understand that this was not a normal governorship. Herman 
Talmadge started his tenure due to the “Three Governors Controversy,” an event in which 
Eugene Talmadge was elected Governor but died before taking office in 1947. Subsequently, 
Herman Talmadge, Eugene Talmadge’s son, was elected by the General Assembly while at the 
same time, Ellis Arnall, the outgoing Governor, also claimed the office. The third Governor in this 
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controversy was Melvin E. Thompson, the newly elected Lieutenant Governor, who also believed 
that he should inherit the station as Governor.81 
 During the controversy, Herman Talmadge filled the role of Governor. Eventually, in 
March of 1947, the Georgia Supreme Court settled the issue by ruling that Melvin Thompson was 
the rightful Governor, just days after Herman Talmadge signed the RTW laws. 82 Talmadge went 
even further by making an alleged political deal with Representative Cicero Kendrick of Fulton 
County. According to this deal, Representative Kendrick voted in favor of Talmadge assuming the 
governorship following his father’s death in exchange for Talmadge vetoing any anti-labor bill 
that reached his desk.83 While Representative Kendrick denied the allegation, there was a single 
stray vote against the RTW laws passing unanimously which likely came from Kendrick. 84 This 
vote suggests that the backroom deal between Representative Kendrick and Talmadge did take 
place, yet Governor Talmadge caved to the overwhelming pressure presented by the anti-union 
General Assembly. After all, Talmadge had political ambitions of his own, as he would go on to 
run against Melvin Thompson in the special election held later the following year.85 Talmadge 
needed the support of the anti-union General Assembly to win the election and thus, decided to 
burn one political bridge over the 41 others seated in the state Senate. 
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2.2 The Unions Response 
 Regardless why or how these anti-union laws came about, they became a reality. The 
labor unions needed to decide what their response would be and how to combat these laws. One 
of the first substantial statements provided by a union leader came from Van A. Bittner, the 
Director of the CIO’s Organizing Committee in charge of the Southern campaign.86 In a statement 
to the House Labor Committee, Bittner said that “repressive labor legislation, if enacted by 
Congress, will prevent Southern workers from achieving the benefits of a standard of living equal 
to that of workers in other parts of the country.”87 The “repressive labor legislation” referred to 
here is the proposed Taft-Hartley Act then making its rounds at the Capitol. Since the Taft-Hartley 
Act and the State level RTW laws go hand in hand, if organized labor pushed back on one, they 
could combat the other at the same time. While at the Capitol, Bittner took time to highlight his 
organizations' political stance by mentioning that the House Labor Committee would have their 
time better spent combating the rising cost of living and fighting for an expansion of Social 
Security rather than attempting to cripple unions.88 These sentiments would eventually be 
echoed in the CIO’s proposals addressing key issues that the CIO believed both political parties 
fell short on in the next election cycle.89 Bittner also claimed that the House Labor Committee 
took its marching orders from the National Association of Manufacturers, which were conducting 
a drive to eliminate labor unions across the United States to maximize their profits.90 
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 Later in March of 1947, the Georgia RTW laws officially made it through the Georgia 
General Assembly, and the CIO met the news head-on with challenges from Charles Gilman, the 
Georgia director for the CIO. Gilman stated that he just came from a meeting with around 200 of 
the states’ labor leaders in which they adopted a resolution to form committees to organize 
workers in defense of labor rights.91 Gilman also stated that he did not believe that the Georgia 
RTW laws will impact many CIO-affiliated labor unions as the CIO unions generally deal in 
interstate commerce, meaning the CIO union contracts would be protected by Federal law. 92 
While the Wagner Act still allowed for close shop unions and voluntary check-off dues collection 
banned under the Georgia RTW laws, the incoming Taft-Hartley Act attempted to force unions to 
follow pro-business law. This interplay between the two laws is further evidence that Taft-Hartley 
and the RTW laws were codependent – namely without the strong ground game originally 
provided by RTW laws across the United States, the Taft-Hartley Act would not have been 
needed. Simultaneously, supporters of state-level RTW laws needed federal legislation to gut the 
Wagner Act, therefore allowing for harsh labor laws throughout the states. 
 While the CIO had begun fighting against the proposed Taft-Hartley Act and local RTW 
laws, the AFL was preparing a legal offensive in early March 1947. George Googe, the Southern 
Director of the Organization of the AFL, stated that his organization would seek to respond 
immediately to the Georgia RTW laws as soon as the General Assembly finished its 
deliberations.93 While the AFL mulled over its next strategic move, pro-labor groups across the 
South believed that the RTW laws passed in various states fell into a grand, national scheme to 
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influence lawmakers to pass the Taft-Hartley Act.94 Pro-capitalist organizations, such as the Mont 
Pelerin Society and the National Association of Manufacturers, ran their own campaigns to 
combat the “radical labor organizations” and to protect capitalism. 95  In doing so, they effectively 
created a synthetic grassroots movement to prop up the Taft-Hartley Act at the national level. 
 It was not until the end of March of 1947 that George Googe made a statement on the 
Georgia RTW laws. Googe kicked off his speech by stating that the “AFL will file a suit to test the 
constitutionality of the RTW laws which Acting Governor Talmadge signed.”96 Googe was feeling 
confident in the AFL’s legal might, as they had already attacked RTW laws in other states, and the 
AFL legal counsel believed that these laws interfered with existing union contracts operating 
under the Wagner Act. As the Wagner Act was a federal law, it superseded the state law, further 
providing a perceived advantage to labor and the AFL.97 Googe continued to voice concerns over 
the longevity of the AFL and labor unions in general without the union security agreements 
currently in place, such as check-offs and the closed shop. Without these security measures in 
place, Googe worried that the unions would be forced to accept anti-union spies, workers loyal 
to competing labor organizations, or worse, Communists.98 
 Though it may seem comical now, fear of admitting Communists was a legitimate concern 
for Googe and his labor union. The press tended to attack unions as Communist organizations, 
but these unions were simply not the radical, leftist monsters their opponents made them out to 
be. For example, a  CIO’s Political Action Committee PAC  memo mentioned that the CIO 
 
94 “Labor Protest Looms On Newly-Passed Laws,” Atlanta Constitution, March 27, 1947.  
95 Philips-Fein, Invisible Hands, 43, 13. 
96 “AFL To Test State Anti-Labor Laws In ‘Constitutionality’ Suit—Googe,” Atlanta Constitution, March 30, 1947. 
97 “AFL To Test State Anti-Labor Laws In ‘Constitutionality’ Suit—Googe,” Atlanta Constitution, March 30, 1947. 




union would not incorporate Communist, Socialist, or even Socialist Labor policies. Instead, the 
CIO would continue to operate under the existing political order.99 They were simply looking for 
minor reforms that were comparable to some proposed Democratic Party platforms, such as 
supporting a Wage-Hour Law to institute a 75 cent minimum wage, and the use federal aid to 
support education in the United States.100 
 In his speech against the RTW laws, Googe highlighted the Georgia State Constitution 
section that contradicts the RTW laws' validity. Googe pointed out that §3, Paragraph 2 of the 
Georgia Constitution states, “No Bill of Attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or law 
impairing the obligation of contracts, or making irrevocable grant of special privileges or 
immunities shall be passed.”101 The RTW laws passed in Georgia would void many existing labor 
union contracts with closed shop or dues check-off clauses which was prohibited by the Georgia 
Constitution, and Googe believed that the Georgia Supreme Court would utilize this prohibition 
to rule in the AFL’s favor. Near the end of his speech, Googe softened upon his hardline approach. 
He reiterated that the AFL is not in the business of breaking the law and will follow the court's 
decision. Should the RTW laws be upheld after a legal challenge, the AFL will accept them as law 
and comply with the decision.102 Googe showed the public that unions did not have crooks or 
monsters who were in it for themselves but rather were regular law-abiding, working Americans.   
 While direct and forceful, his comments yielded no change in how management 
interacted with the unions in Georgia. Following his speech, Googe would eventually tell all AFL-
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affiliated unions to refuse to do business with any company or organization that did not recognize 
the existing union contracts.103 There was almost no reason for companies to recognize sections 
of existing contracts because of the new laws. Upon the contract expiring, the companies would 
use the new laws to negotiate future contracts. Of course, this required the companies to come 
to the table in good faith, which was not likely to happen. Businesses used the passage of these 
new anti-labor, anti-union laws to strike back on labor and seize the advantage after years of 
capitulating to union strength. Googe highlighted this point because, in Georgia, the lumber 
industry was 99 percent unorganized, and naval stores were totally unorganized. Considering the 
lumber industry was the second largest industry in Georgia, and naval stores were the third 
largest, Googe made clear that industry management does not need extra legislative help to meet 
their demands.104 
 It was not as if the unions were without political and economic muscle in the fight. In 
1946, the AFL had signed up 37,000 new members in the South alone, which helped to bolster 
their ranks in the upcoming fight against anti-union legislation.105 Googe also made clear that the 
AFL, and other pro-union groups, needed the extra help as he is worried that the Taft-Hartley 
Act, which was pending in Congress, would “change the free trade union movement into social 
clubs under control of Federal bureaucracies.”106 
 After the Taft-Hartley Act passed over President Truman’s veto, organized labor needed 
to act fast to prevent their groups from getting steamrolled by management. The Act itself, and 
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the language found within, is tailor-made to protect capitalism and the profits of the American 
bourgeois from labor unions. The Taft-Hartley Act goes so far as to state unambiguously, “the 
purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow of commerce, [is] to prescribe 
the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce.”107 
While at first glance the language in the bill seems more common sense rather than vehemently 
anti-union, the purpose of the Taft-Hartley Act was always to guard businesses from unions while 
also making it more difficult for unions to grow their numbers. 
 Against all warnings from union leaders, Taft-Hartley was passed in June of 1947. Some 
reporters began their coverage of the legislation in opposition to it. Thomas L. Stokes, Pulitzer 
prize-winning journalist, criticized the fairness of the Taft-Hartley Act, writing that,  “Nothing 
illustrates so well the one-sidedness of the new labor laws as the belated, guilty conscience sort 
of cautions from management spokesmen that management must not take advantage of the law 
to injure labor.”108 Stokes noted that this about-face from management is in direct contradiction 
to their previous arguments claiming that this law was to bring labor relations back to a full 
partnership, rather than some alleged union dominance.109 
George Googe of the AFL stated one month prior to the passing of the Taft-Hartley Act; there 
were still massive industries in the South and in Georgia that have yet to be organized by the 
unions.110 Hampering union growth, especially in the South, was a plan created by ordinary 
businessmen over the course of several years to undo the labor union's power and to undermine 
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the gains created by the New Deal.111 This years-long campaign was so successful because of the 
pro-business gains created by these RTW laws which helped gain national support for the Taft-
Hartley Act and helped generate more interest in passing national regulations to strengthen the 
power of businesses in the RTW States. Before the Taft-Hartley Act, unions were fighting an uphill 
battle against anti-union propaganda, and management was not eager to allow their workforces 
to unionize. With the new national labor laws, union leaders were worried that management 
would use the new provisions in the law to further exploit workers by taking advantage of the 
Taft-Hartley Act's business-first mentality.112 
 Thomas Stokes laid the blame for passing the Taft-Hartley Act on Southern Dixiecrats for 
voting with the Republicans on the initial vote and on overriding the presidential veto.113 It is not 
surprising that Dixiecrats teamed up with Republicans to pass anti-labor legislation, given that 
there is massive resistance to unionization in the South even today. It was apparent that 
Dixiecrats’ motivations were to side with the Republicans.114 Dixiecrats needed this legislation 
because businesses in the South had already seen the effects of RTW laws through the 
cancelation of existing labor contracts with unions. These businesses did not want to deal with 
lengthy courtroom battles over state labor laws not aligning with federal regulations. With the 
passage of Taft-Hartley, they would not have to.  
 Thomas Stokes pointed out that businesses needed the South to remain un-unionized to 
keep the South a low-wage area.115 If the low-wage economy remained, the South would have a 
 
111 Philips-Fein, Invisible Hands, xi. 
112 “Lays Labor Bill Blame on Southerners,” Atlanta Constitution, June 26, 1947. 
113 “Lays Labor Bill Blame on Southerners,” Atlanta Constitution, June 26, 1947. 
114 “Lays Labor Bill Blame on Southerners,” Atlanta Constitution, June 26, 1947. 




better chance at attracting new businesses looking to cut spending costs and maximizing investor 
profits. This cold and calculated model for business growth meant that the American bourgeois 
would do almost anything to maintain a labor pool full of exploited and alienated workers in an 
effort to keep an exploitable working class. The same line of thought is applicable to 
contemporary issues such as minimum wage laws and for-profit prisons. The ultimate lesson here 
is that a small minority can dictate policy for the majority of the country that is not to their 
benefit.116 The only hope to restore the balance between labor and business is to repeal the Taft-
Hartley Act and RTW laws across the country. 
2.3 Unions Challenge the RTW Laws 
 It did not take long for the AFL and George Googe to challenge the Georgia RTW legislation 
in court. In August of 1947 union officials from the North Carolina Buildings Trades Council were 
convicted for signing a union contract that had a closed shop and involuntary check-off provisions 
built-in.117 Of course, these provisions were banned by the RTW laws in North Carolina and 
Georgia.118 A Superior Court ruling could allow for the United States Supreme Court to review 
the Taft-Hartley Act and local RTW laws. Triggering a Supreme Court review of existing labor laws 
is undoubtedly what George Googe and the AFL had in mind when the North Carolina Supreme 
Court got involved with the case.119 Googe clearly stated that if North Carolina upheld the lower 
court’s decision, the AFL would appeal directly to the United States Supreme Court.120 A few days 
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after his pledge to challenge the constitutionality of the RTW laws with the Supreme Court, 
George Googe made another public statement reiterating the AFL’s commitment to fighting RTW 
laws and the Taft-Hartley Act. Googe said that “not since the days when a labor union was a 
conspiracy has the weight of law and government been thrown so savagely and so patently 
against the right of the working people to organize.”121 
 While labor organizers continued to make statements to the press, the AFL planned their 
next strategic move for the legal battles ahead, the press was editorializing the Taft-Hartley Act 
to soften the blow to Georgians. In a series of articles designed to “Explain in simple, non-
technical language the provisions of the controversial Taft-Hartley labor Law,” journalist Phelps 
Adams argued that the Taft-Hartley Act was an effort to broaden the appeal of anti-labor laws in 
general.122 Adams noted that instead of the “slave labor act” that labor leaders described it as, 
the Taft-Hartley Act actually seeks to give American workers “complete freedom in choosing a 
job or a union.”123 Under the Taft-Hartley Act, the American worker now has the right not to 
choose to work under a union and is now protected against “intimidation and coercion from any 
source.”124 Adams proceeded to highlight the fact that no employee could be forced to work 
against his will, and that any individual may quit their job at any time.125 Being able to quit a job 
at any time sounds good in theory, but the modern-day reality for failing to provide a two weeks’ 
notice prior to quitting could lead to a poor reference by an employer preventing ease of 
transitioning to new employment. On the other hand, employers can terminate an employee on 
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the spot. This lack of true equality under the RTW laws highlights the fact that these new 
regulations defended capitalists over the working class. Adams concluded that “Finally, the law 
seeks to make union officers the servants – not the masters – of their union membership. To a 
few notorious union bosses, such a condition might well appear to be “slavery” indeed.”126 
 Implying that union leaders were simply grumpy because they could not get their way any 
longer under the Taft-Hartley Act was yet another way to paint union organizers as criminal mob 
bosses seeking to enrich themselves. Even if union leaders were to enrich themselves, who would 
stand to hurt the most from workers organizing? The simple answer is businesses. It is in business 
owners’ best interest to pay low wages, work employees long hours, and provide few benefits. 
We see this same business incentive today as companies fight against raising the minimum wage 
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3 THE UNIONS  POLITICAL WAR 
 1948 was a new year that brought about new challenges to anti-labor laws across the 
country and across union lines. Both CIO and AFL affiliated unions began to push harder against 
the Taft-Hartley Act and local RTW legislation. Both unions had “invited a test of a section of the 
Act prohibiting expenditures of union or corporation funds in connection with a Federal primary 
or election.”128 The unions believed this portion of the Taft-Hartley Act to be unconstitutional 
and thus began financially supporting pro-labor candidates in races across the United States, such 
as Estes Kefauver of Tennessee and Edward Garmatz of Maryland. 129  Even more terrifying to the 
Dixiecrats was that Kefauver won the Democratic nomination, proving that labor still had fight 
left in them. Allowing labor to regain strength was out of the question, so the power of the federal 
government mobilized against the CIO and the head of the organization, Philip Murray. A federal 
grand jury indicted the CIO and Philip Murray on the grounds that the CIO newspaper, created 
with union funds, was illegal under the Taft-Hartley Act.130 Across the nation, unions were 
pushing back against RTW laws as they faced a torrent of challenges from states in order to crush 
the labor movement. In Arizona, the State Supreme Court ruled in favor of RTW laws, seemingly 
pushing the national needle in favor of management and capitalists.131 
 Though the charges were brought against Murray, the government began to waver on 
how much they should exploit the new laws in their favor. The attorney general, Tom C. Clark, 
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announced that additional prosecutions were being prepared against the union and Phillip 
Murray while also admitting that a delicate constitutional issue was involved.132 Even Senator 
Taft, the Taft-Hartley Act's co-author, for some reason conceded that the government might have 
made a mistake bringing charges against the union. Senator Taft could have said this out of guilt 
or to stave off a more radicalized labor response to the prosecution of a labor leader. Whatever 
the reason, Taft still stood by his anti-labor law and advocated for the courts to clear up any 
questions that may arise from the Act.133 Further, the labor unions were not a political super 
giant that single-handedly won Estes Kefauver or Edward Garmatz an election. While the AFL and 
CIO did back Kefauver and Garmatz politically, there were other factors that led to both 
candidates winning their elections. What was happening here is capital, the state, the right, and 
management using these small wins as a rally cry to enact even more strict laws and punishments 
against the unions.   
3.1 De Cer ea s S ra eg  s  Tac ics 
 Compared to the overwhelming power demonstrated by capital and management, these 
temporary wins are a prime example of the historical theory of tactics and strategies developed 
by Michel de Certeau. De Certeau theorized that when a person or entity was in a position of 
power, they would employ grand strategies to maintain that power. In contrast, those not in the 
positions of power would employ tactics to gain small and temporary wins against their foe.134 In 
this case, the labor unions' tactics would be to engage in strikes, establish closed shop policies, 
utilize dues check-offs, and endorse pro-labor candidates. The grand strategy employed by 
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capital and management had been use of anti-union propaganda and attempts to convince the 
working class to vote in favor of management under the guise of benefitting workers. Thus, in 
highlighting every misstep taken by labor and making them out to be a massive political force, 
management was free to make laws and restrictions that could stand up to the “monster” called 
labor unions.  
 On February 13th, 1948, George Googe asked the Governor of Georgia, Melvin Thompson, 
to request its Attorney General to issue an official ruling on the Georgia RTW laws.135 Googe was 
right to start involving the Governor as he had spoken with roughly 900 smaller local unions in 
Georgia who were stressed from the restrictive, and quite possibly unconstitutional, RTW laws.136 
In a statement to reporters, Googe highlighted that “Many features of the state laws conflict with 
the Taft-Harley Act. The state laws not only restrict freedom of contracts but unlawfully prohibit 
labor organizations from organizing in constitutionally-protected activities for the benefit of a 
majority of the employees in any given unit.”137 The issue of renewing union contracts was 
initially brought up in 1947 by Googe.138 Renewing contracts became progressively more difficult 
for unions at a time when negotiations for creating new contracts and even renewing existing 
contracts had ground to a halt as a result of the RTW laws.139 George Googe and the AFL were 
furious with the RTW laws because they painted the unions in a corner and they struggled to get 
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out. The provisions of the RTW laws made it illegal to carry out existing contracts while also 
making it nearly impossible for the unions to negotiate new contracts in which they would have 
any real influence.140 Pro-business individuals were able to fall back on the courts and sway public 
opinion as a grand strategy in combating unions, while the unions had to rely on tactics such as 
strikes and public rallies to fight for small gains within the system of capitalism. Further 
highlighting De Certeau’s theory of strategies versus tactics. 
 This dilemma was what instigated the passage of the RTW laws in the first place. The new 
restrictions did not directly affect non-union workers, and, as a result, those not in a union cared 
a lot less about the underlying implications held in the RTW laws. Further, even some active union 
workers bought into company propaganda portraying labor unions as a form of Communism and 
actively sought to curb union power from within the unions themselves. Several companies took 
advantage of the active campaigns to equate unions with Communism and began to publish their 
own anti-communist propaganda.141 
 Pending some miracle in the courts, the AFL and CIO were going to have to find ways to 
work around the RTW laws if they were to exist. The union’s second route to the capitalists  
foothold came in the form of influencing the election of the Georgia governor. With a resolution 
to the “Three Governors Controversy” dilemma, the governorship was up for grabs again, and 
the unions were ready for another battle. According to labor organizers, Georgia’s ,  union 
members were prepared to vote in larger numbers than ever before.142 Unfortunately, given the 
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momentous political strength wielded by the Georgia Farm Bureau Federation, neither front-
runner for the governorship would openly promise to revise Georgia labor laws.143 Labor leaders 
were furious with H. L. Wingate and his band of farmers for forcing through the stiff anti-labor 
legislation and thus were forced to accept that neither Herman Talmadge nor his opponent, 
former Governor Melvin E. Thompson, would actively fight for more substantial union rights.144   
 There were, however, other ways to court union support than just fighting for their right 
to exist. Herman Talmage made a promise to the AFL that he would fight against the CIO, which 
of course, garnered positive attention from the AFL.145 Making a deal with the AFL was a tactful 
political move for Talmadge for a few reasons, but mainly because he made a promise to the AFL, 
which acknowledged their political strength and would garner him a sizeable chunk of those 
325,000 union voters. Moreover, Talmadge was strengthening the power of the Georgia Farm 
Bureau by pitting the unions against each other, thereby weakening the strength of all unions, 
even as George Googe visited with Talmadge’s camp to promote the interests of the AFL.146 
 The 1948 Georgia gubernatorial special election concluded with AFL’s Herman Talmadge 
securing the primary in a landslide and then elected Governor.147 There was, however, one more 
important election that AFL organizer George Googe had a vested interest in. That election was, 
of course, the 1948 presidential race, in which President Truman won Georgia by a significant 
margin.148 Googe believed that this election showed Georgia lawmakers that Georgia voters were 
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far more progressive than some may have realized and that it spelled the end for the restrictive 
anti-labor laws plaguing the country.149 Labor organizations showed up to support the re-election 
of President Truman. This resulted in some business leaders believing the Nation was barreling 
toward a “labor government” by recognizing the role labor played in President Truman’s re-
election.150 We again see business leaders ratcheting up a make-believe threat to encourage 
those with right-leaning political beliefs to become more staunch in their anti-union beliefs. 
Business leaders would like for the general population to believe that unions, and specifically 
union bosses, had the President in their pocket. Business leaders believed that this would then 
lead to Communism destroying American democracy and replacing the free enterprise system 
with some form of barbaric authoritarianism, which would result in the deaths of thousands.151   
 Of course, none of this happened, and America is still a profit-driven capitalist economy. 
These same protections that remained in place for businesses has arguably been instrumental in 
the making of the ultra-rich businessmen we see today. To the relief of business leaders then and 
now, capitalism is here to stay. There was, however, one other man who would be relieved that 
America bought into the idea of Capitalism. George Googe was, as demonstrated earlier, quite 
anti-Communist. He was also, evidently, anti-Socialist. Googe stated that “there was no 
comparison with the labor government in England and the labor movement in America. The 
English labor movement was socialistic, while the American labor movement was based on the 
profit system of Capitalism.”152 This statement from Googe further showed him attempting to 
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separate the labor movement from accusations that those engaging in labor activism were all 
communist or socialist traitors to America. It was evident that Googe was “reading the room” 
and attempting to make the labor movement more palatable for the average American who 
might not be sure what to make of labor activism in America, no matter how much they enjoy 
their weekend. 
 Moreover, the re-election of Truman could also be read as a rebuke to the corporate 
propaganda machine. State Senator Walter George stated that “Mr. Truman’s magnificent 
victory proved that the rank and file of Americans did not wish to change administrations when 
all people have a job or can get a job. The election of a Democratic President and Democratic 
Congress meant the continuation of America’s present foreign policy and that farmers felt more 
comfortable under a Democratic administration.”153 The farmers here are a reference to the 
Georgia Farm Bureau Federation, in an apparent challenge of H. L. Wingate’s political hold on 
Georgian farmers. 
 George Googe was no doubt content with the results of the presidential election, as he 
believed that a Truman presidency would spell the end for not only the draconian RTW laws in 
Georgia but also the Taft-Hartley Act itself. Googe expected labor leaders to be consulted for the 
next set of labor laws that would govern the country’s labor unions.154 On the other side of the 
labor issue, Herman Talmadge was shocked by the presidential race, viewing it as a noticeable 
blow against his anti-labor efforts across his career in government thus far.155 Regardless what 
Talmadge thought, there was no doubt labor leaders genuinely believed they had a shot at ending 
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the Taft-Hartley Act. Though even with seemingly a good chance at legal challenges going their 
way, labor unions’ tactics were not strong enough to keep up with pro-business strategies. 
 All the while, businesses greatest ally, the press, continued to publish propaganda on their 
behalf. Articles entitled “Protect the Right To Work” and “Hurting Labor’s Cause” were published 
during the RTW fight in Georgia in the Atlanta Constitution newspaper, framing picketing as a 
violation of strike breakers’ constitutional rights and the unions needed to be held accountable 
for their actions which harm Americans.156 The articles further argued that the RTW is just as 
important as the right to strike.157 The articles, however, also editorialized the events to paint 
unions as criminals, in which case the police should intervene.158 
3.2 Googe s Retirement and Rise of Rhodes 
 The existence of RTW laws made unions much harder to maintain and even harder for 
unions to gather political capital to spend on improving workers’ rights. Googe fought all he could 
against the RTW laws. Nevertheless, George Googe stepped down from his post within the AFL 
in December of 1948.159 Googe left the AFL because he had recently accepted the Vice President's 
position for the International Pressman’s and Assistants’ Union, an AFL affiliate.160 Googe spent 
20 years in service to the AFL, and this was an acceptable way to bow out of his position as leader 
of the AFL by accepting a promotion with a respectable union. Googe morphed into a union boss, 
ironically the same thing that business leaders had been out to get since the Great Depression.161 
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George Googe remained active in the AFL, fighting for his new union and the rights of all workers. 
However, his time in the spotlight of the fight against the RTW laws and the Taft-Hartley Act 
ended. 
 George Googe’s replacement was no slouch and was well suited to re-energize labor for 
the fight. J. L Rhodes replaced Googe as the leader of the AFL. As soon as Rhodes stepped into 
his new position, he put a significant emphasis on the AFL’s organizational, educational, and 
legislative work.162 Rhodes stated that the AFL’s legislative work on public welfare would be the 
union's primary focus, while management and labor would come second.163 This announcement 
was an explicit concession from labor that they did not have the political capital required to 
combat these anti-labor laws that battered them for two years now. Even still, the AFL remained 
committed to bettering the lives of the working class through other means, such as their push to 
raise the minimum wage. 
 Alternatively, this concession can be interpreted as the AFL and Rhodes’s attempt to 
launch a new approach. By committing themselves to the betterment of the public good, they 
could preemptively work against current and future anti-union propaganda. Rhodes also made it 
clear that the AFL will absolutely fight Georgia s RTW laws until they were “made no more 
restrictive than that of other sections of the country.”164 Clearly, Rhodes was attempting to make 
the AFL look more appealing to the average American thereby contradicting anti-union 
propaganda currently circulating in the media. 
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 After Rhodes was welcomed into the AFL, he immediately went to work chipping away at 
the RTW laws and the Taft-Hartley Act. Rhodes sought support from Southern legislators to fuel 
a repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act.165 In a speech to the Southern Director of Organizing, Rhodes 
read an impressive list of names of Southern Senators and Representatives he believed would be 
on the side of labor when debating new legislation at the Capitol.166 While Rhodes never 
published the list since he believed that it would be unethical to do so, one is left to wonder how 
many allies labor actually had in its corner.167 Given the recent legal problems the CIO found 
themselves in when supporting political candidates like Estes Kefauver, would lawmakers 
capitulate to labor organizations with less to offer than businesses? Joseph Shister, in his article, 
“The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on Union Strength and Collective Bargaining,” published in 
1958, noted that in the ten years following the passage of the Act, union membership increased. 
Shister wrote that “between  and  trade union membership in this country increased 
from approximately fourteen million to approximately seventeen and one-half million.”168 If the 
base of union members was large enough, and AFL and CIO unions were becoming more and 
more politically active, then Rhodes stood a good chance that politicians would side with the 
unions on specific labor issues in order to secure a voting block for themselves. 
 However, others believed that a block of Republicans and Southern conservatives would 
push back on any attempt to repeal or replace the Taft-Hartley Act.169 Conservatives putting up 
a blockade to prevent repeal made sense as the Taft-Hartley Act allowed states to create RTW 
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legislation to block union shops in at the state level.170 If states had RTW laws already in place, 
there would be no need to appeal to the unions because they have more or less already been 
soundly defeated. As George Googe demonstrated in 1947, there was not much that the unions 
could do to prevent RTW laws from being established or from being repealed. Further, if 
lawmakers were capitulating with management, there would be no need for any cooperation 
with the unions as that was not their voting base. If conservative politicians were seeking votes 
from anti-union individuals, it would be in their best interest to keep the Taft-Hartley Act in place 
so as not to strengthen unions who could then vote them out of office. Managements’ support 
of the Taft-Hartley Act also had the benefit of enriching the same capitalists who were donating 
to conservative politicians' re-election campaigns. As has been demonstrated throughout this 
thesis, money was one of the primary motivators in establishing RTW laws. 
 Regardless what the Republicans and Conservatives were thinking, the AFL continued to 
receive inquiries about the process of forming a union under the banner of the AFL.171 Rhodes 
stated that the idea that the Taft-Hartley Act hampered the ability of labor groups to form new 
unions was unfounded. Rhodes insisted that there were industries such as lumber, textiles, retail 
stores, and white-collar workers who were actively looking to unionize.172 Joseph Shister pointed 
out that union membership continued to increasing during this time. Shister still conceded that 
it was more than likely that union growth would have been significantly higher without the 
roadblocks put in place by the RTW laws or the Taft-Hartley Act. Further, the long-term effects 
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of the Taft-Hartley Act have been devastating for the labor unions. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
reported that there were only approximately 4,000 employed union members in Georgia in 
2020.173 Four thousand is a sharp decrease from the once gargantuan 325,000 recorded in 
1948.174  
 The writing was on the wall for the labor unions and Rhodes knew it. Rhodes and the AFL 
devised a massive two-pronged drive that would work to repeal RTW laws across the South and 
to organize workers across the South to create new AFL-affiliated unions or get them to join 
existing AFL unions.175 However, labors tactics began to falter in the face of the pro-business 
strategy. The American labor movement would succumb to the unchecked might of pro-business 
organizations and their propaganda campaigns. The RTW laws proved insurmountable for the 
labor unions. The American labor movement was on life support, even for those moderate unions 
who sought to protect American capitalism. Without real support from lawmakers in their 
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 The years 1947 and 1948 were challenging for labor unions to overcome, especially in the 
South. While the AFL and CIO continued to strengthen labor’s position in the Southern States, 
members of the pro-business community challenged them in the form of anti-union propaganda 
and new legal battles. In reaction to pro-business opposition, labor unions doubled down on their 
political activism. During this period in Georgia, the AFL’s and CIO’s dissatisfaction with Governor 
Thompson and Talmadge was relatively limited.176 Knowing they were losing political capital, the 
unions understood they must do something to preserve the American labor movement. After 
winning a couple of local elections in the North, the labor movement focused on more significant 
political gains.177 Jack Kroll, the director of the CIO’s Political Action Committee PAC , 
determined that the CIO would become an “every-year, all-year, and across-the board” political 
machine capable of winning big elections and paying attention to critical local elections as well.178 
The attention to local elections was, without a doubt, a response to the incredibly successful 
political initiative to establish the Taft-Hartley Act through local RTW laws. By focusing on local 
elections, labor unions could seek to prevent the spread of RTW laws and look for opportunities 
to repeal existing legislation.   
 In July of 1949, CIO President Philip Murray announced a pending purge of anti-labor 
Senators who voted with Senator Robert Taft on the Taft-Hartley Act.179 The CIO was not alone 
in this push against anti-union Senators. The AFL also announced that there would be an AFL 
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conference later in July where the focus would be the Labor’s League for Political Education and 
the discussion of political strategy for the coming year.180 The International Association of 
Machinists conducted a tally of Senators to decide who was for and against labor to identify 
potential political targets for a 1950 offensive. They identified 13 Senators who would be running 
for re-election in 1950.181 The Machinists’ President Al Hayes stated that “labor is only five votes 
short of a majority in the Senate. Of those who voted against labor in the Senate, 13 will have to 
stand for re-election next year if they wish to continue in the Senate. Next year’s election gives 
us another opportunity to … repeal the un-American Taft-Hartley Act.”182 
 Al Hayes was right to be confident since during 1949 there were still active labor drives in 
the South targeting African American workers. To regain their political strength, the unions would 
need more than just a few new members to combat the rising business influence. The CIO and 
AFL began to contemplate putting their competitive natures aside and work together on the 
campaign trail. In October of 1949, CIO President Philip Murray marched with the AFL in a labor 
unity parade to propose pooling the two labor organizations' political resources and forming a 
combined war chest.183 Throughout 1949, labor won several fights but lost a few too. Their most 
disappointing loss was the failure to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act.184 Following the union's 
endorsement of President Truman in 1948, the unions gained more political capital in the 1949 
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election cycle by earning a share of the Democratic Party’s election victories.185 The unions also 
secured improvements in pensions, welfare, and a 75-cent minimum wage increase, all following 
strikes. Reporters portrayed the CIO’s purge of Communists from their ranks as a significant win 
for unions.186 
 This was viewed as a win for the unions because with Communists in their ranks, the 
unions’ political capital would be stunted until they solved that issue. Communism played the 
role of ideological “boogieman” for most of the ’s – from the 30s onward. The purge of 
Communists from the unions’ ranks was also seen as solidifying the status quo. In the s 
Communism was seen as an ideology which led to the “hatred of god, destruction of property, 
social and racial equality and class hatred, advocating of violence, strikes, riots, destruction of all 
forms of representative and democratic governments.”187 Further, as the Communist ideology 
was viewed as “an evil brought in by foreign organizers” from exotic lands, such as Russia or 
sometimes even Pittsburg, those in power wanted to confront this ideological invasion with 
militant loyalty to one’s nation and culture.188 These notions led to the idea that one drop of 
American blood is worth more than an entire river of Communist blood.189 The anti-Communist 
ideologies went so far that a U.S. Senate subcommittee was formed in the mid ’s to 
investigate civil liberties’ violations across the country.190 The Senate subcommittee investigation 
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found numerous affidavits from Communists and trade union organizers who had experienced 
vigilante violence and police repression because of their organizing activities.191 Regardless of the 
violence or brutality facing Communist union members, cutting Communists out of the unions to 
appease anti-union propagandists did not reduce the amount of disinformation being published. 
Anti-union propaganda had taken many forms, most recently in Amazon’s attempt at using 
artificial intelligence (AI) Twitter bots to post anti-union propaganda. (In 2021, Amazon 
successfully quashed a push for unionization at an Alabama facility).192  
4.1 Westbrook Pegler and Anti-Union Writing 
 Organized labor invested over $1 million into political campaigns in the 1950 election to 
give their pro-working class candidates a better chance to win their elections.193 Of course, as the 
Taft-Hartley Act forbids unions from contributing directly to political campaigns, unions reported 
this money under “educational” funds.194 The use of so-called “educational funds” for 
campaigning is hardly the most egregious breach of campaign finance laws; however, certain 
critics of the labor movement took issue with the unions circumventing the law. Critics such as 
Westbrook Pegler published several anti-union articles for the Atlanta Constitution newspaper 
when the Taft-Hartley Act was created. Pegler took issue with the labor education programs and 
even had the opportunity to denounce them in front of a Congressional Committee in 1949.195 
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 Westbrook Pegler was one of many journalists who helped to promote the far-right 
propaganda campaign used to crush the labor movement. Pegler ultimately bought into the idea 
that Communists were running unions for their own monetary gain.196 He wrote his 
condemnation of Communists in labor unions in 1949 when labor unions were purging those 
same Communists further highlighting the dishonesty that members of the press demonstrated 
when writing on unions.197 Additionally, even into 1949, as Right to Work laws had been 
popularized, Pegler was still writing about how closed shop rules in unions were harming 
workers.198 Pegler wrote about the coercion of workers without once criticizing capitalism or 
labor exploitation. Instead, Pegler was of the mindset that labor laws should not exist to protect 
workers in this country. Opting to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act, pass no other labor law, and 
encourage both management and the United States Government to ignore unions altogether.199 
He would, however, allow unions to bargain collectively. Outside of legal strikes, Pegler would 
have the United States military take action should the need arise.200  
 Pegler highlighted his anti-Union stance when he sympathized with business leaders after 
they “submit to mob violence-lynching-by labor union  goons.”201 To further demonstrate his 
indifference to Unions, Pegler added that “ The Wagner Act  was designed to drive millions of 
people into unions as taxpaying serfs under the worst aggregation of rascals that this country had 
seen since Reconstruction and to provide financial and political power for Wagner’s party. It has 
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also caused the worst series of riots and lynchings in the life of our country.”202 This hyperbole 
that unions were responsible for the worst series of lynchings in our country’s long history, 
including during the Reconstruction era, were outdone by himself later when he wrote that the 
New Deal was Fascist and that Roosevelt was a cheap imitation of Mussolini and Hitler.203 
Furthering his argument that labor unions are fascist, Pegler condemned the CIO unionizing the 
South by writing, “ fascist attacks  are trifling by comparison with the wild insurrections, the 
bloody onslaughts and nocturnal terrors which the CIO employed in its organizing days to 
conquer the manhood of citizens holding out against the goons. If I were a Southern man, having 
read the threats of the CIO to ‘invade’ the South in the old manner of Michigan, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania, I would join the Klan for defense.”204 By denouncing the unions for executing the 
most lynchings in United States history and then turning around to fantasize about joining the 
KKK, Pegler espouses the far-right in his writing. The defense of the Klan does not stop there, as 
Pegler continues by saying that, “the old Ku Klux never aspired to be or to dominate a 
government. It established a code and a fear which made peaceful living possible and then 
vanished.”205 Peaceful, for who? He never says. Pegler labeled the unions as fascist and terrorist 
organizations while defending the Klan as peace-seeking Southerners.  
 Westbrook Pegler is just one example of anti-union propagandist. Still, his anti-union 
stand of the RTW laws, Taft-Hartley Act, and other anti-union legislation is not unique to him. 
Other anti-union groups still operate today, such as the Heritage Foundation, Americans for 
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Prosperity, The American Enterprise Institute, and the National RTW Foundation, push content 
to influence public opinion on RTW laws and other anti-union measures. Using these 
organizations to publish pro-business propaganda, wealthy individuals can use RTW laws as 
political pawns to create more lucrative business opportunities. Limiting bargaining rights for 
unions and keeping wages low allowed for business owners to cultivate fertile ground in which 
to grow their business and enrich themselves and their shareholders. This mirrors what 
happened in Georgia and other Southern States when the RTW laws were used to pave the way 
for the Taft-Hartley Act to become national law. When the RTW laws were implemented in the 
South, business leaders came out in such strong support for the new laws that Senator Robert 
Taft saw an opportunity to push his new labor law. With the help of business leaders, the Taft-
Hartley Act sailed through the voting process overcoming a presidential veto to become law. 
Following the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, Senator Taft won his re-election in Ohio in 1950 
and immediately hinted at his bid for the presidency in 1952.206 
4.2 Where Does Labor Go From Here 
 Following his landslide win in Ohio, Senator Taft stated in a victory speech that, “ The 
people of Ohio  have rejected President Truman’s program for imposing a socialistic planned 
economy on the American people and expressed their lack of confidence in his foreign policy and 
the State Department.”207 Senator Taft attempted to kill the labor movement by starting locally 
at the state level, then working his way up to the federal level to become President. Should he 
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have succeeded, who knows what other anti-labor legislation would have become law. 
Regardless, Taft fell short of getting the Republican nomination for president in 1948 and 1952 
and died in 1953.208 While Taft did not become US President, one is left to wonder what would 
have happened if he had succeeded? Unfortunately, using RTW laws as a steppingstone in order 
to gain something greater is not as uncommon as it may seem. This strategy has been 
implemented as recently as the 2016 election. 
 In 2012 Governor Rick Snyder signed House Bill 4003 and Senate Bill 116 to add Michigan 
to the list of RTW states.209 Governor Snyder had this opportunity because of Dick DeVos and his 
Mariana Trench-sized deep pockets. Some Republican Senators were initially on board with 
passing RTW laws, but not enough for the bills to pass. Dick DeVos took matters into his own 
hands and met with state lawmakers and offered to fund their campaign if they voted in favor of 
the RTW laws.210 The promise of funding convinced some lawmakers to give DeVos their vote, 
but some lawmakers were not so easily swayed. Dick DeVos had a special plan for these 
lawmakers. He threatened to run those who would not vote in line with his agenda out of town 
by endorsing other Republican candidates against them in upcoming primaries.211  
 After strong-arming the lawmakers, DeVos moved to the next step of his plan: a 
propaganda campaign. DeVos provided talking points to Republicans, re-labeled the RTW law to 
the Freedom to Work, and bought several television ads. The RTW law was then passed in five 
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weeks by the State lawmakers.212 It was apparent that DeVos pushed this issue to weaken the 
Democratic Party in Michigan and make the state easier for a Republican to win in a presidential 
election and kill collective bargaining.213 The 45th President of the United States, Donald Trump, 
would eventually win the State’s  Electoral College votes over former Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton in the 2016 presidential election.214 Moreover, President Trump won the state by fewer 
than 11,000 votes, an amount that could have been a direct result of the defeat of labor in the 
State. 215 
 Further, almost as a thank you to Dick DeVos, President Trump appointed his wife Betsy 
DeVos as the Secretary of Education.216 Here was a wealthy business advocate with ties to the 
American Enterprise Institute, Americans for Prosperity, and other right-wing think tanks, who 
manipulated the RTW laws in a State arguably to swing a Presidential election in his favor.217 In 
return, his family was rewarded with a cabinet position and presidential pardons for Blackwater 
mercenaries after they killed Iraqi civilians in 2007.218 (i.e. Erik Prince, brother of Betsy DeVos and 
founder of Blackwater.)219 
 RTW laws have been used since their creation to provide political advantages for the 
conservative business owners. RTW laws are a two-fold political chess piece that holds invaluable 
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strength for the ruling class. Not only can RTW laws limit the power of unions leading to more 
profits for businesses, but they also slow down unionization altogether. Further, striking such a 
massive blow against the Left and Democrats leads to more political capital for those on the 
Right. RTW laws have been critical in the fight against labor by leading to the creation of the Taft-
Hartley Act, but RTW laws were also essential in the election of Donald Trump to the President's 
office – a President who significantly lowered the corporate tax rate through the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017.220 As argued in other works, such as Selling Free Enterprise (1994) and Invisible 
Hands (2009), the American business class has been at war with the American working class using 
propaganda as their primary weapon. Given the success of RTW laws and how easy they have 
been to adopt, this is a war the business class has been winning. 
 The American business class won the propaganda war, but the effects of them doing so 
also have implications that ripple through states’ union numbers. In  Georgia had roughly 
325,000 union members, with 37,000 of those joining the AFL just the year before.221 
222Considering at the time, some of the largest industries in Georgia were still unorganized, these 
were encouraging numbers for labor in the South. Initial studies conducted on labor union growth 
showed that trade union membership increased between the years 1947-1957, demonstrating 
that unions still had a chance to overcome the disadvantage they held against management.223  
However, as of 2020, Georgia only had 194,000 union members currently employed. These 
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numbers mean that Georgia union workers only account for 4.6 of the state's total employed 
workers.224 In combination with other anti-union propaganda, RTW laws have decimated 
organized labor in the South and in Georgia. 
 For labor to make a comeback, unions would need a miracle. That miracle's name 
is H.R. 2474, more commonly known as the PRO Act of 2019. The Protecting the Right to Organize 
Act (PRO Act) was introduced on May 2nd, 2019, by Representative Robert C. Scott from 
Virginia.225 The Act passed the House in February of 2020 and is currently waiting in the Senate 
for a vote.226 This Act walks back many aspects of the Taft-Hartley Act and prior RTW laws, 
allowing for labor unions to encourage their members to join a strike started by another labor 
organization (also known as a secondary strike) and for collective-bargaining agreements to 
require all workers represented by the bargaining unit to contribute fees to the labor 
organization for the cost of representation, among other protections for labor organizations.227 
Most importantly, the PRO Act would allow for unions to essentially ignore RTW laws.228 The 
American business class power base would be knocked out from under them, and the working 
class in America would be able to join a union with serious bargaining power more efficiently. 
Further, The PRO Act would ban employers from participating in National Labor Relations Board 
meetings, and provide safeguards from management forcing employees to go through anti-union 
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propaganda seminars, making it easier and more convenient to join a union than ever before.229 
The Act will not provide any protection from anti-union propaganda being published in 
newspapers or through right-wing think tanks, but it will protect workers from being forced to sit 
through job-sponsored classes on why unions harm workers.230 
 This Act has not cleared the Senate to get to the President’s desk, however. Therefore, 
the PRO Act's future is still in limbo. Even though President Biden supports the Act and the 
Democrats control the Senate, there is worry that Senate Republicans will use the filibuster to 
kill the Act.231 Senate Republicans are more likely to listen to pro-business groups, such as the 
National Retail Federation and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who are vehemently against the 
PRO Act.232 The Chamber of Commerce said, in a press release titled “Stop the Extreme Agenda,” 
that the PRO Act would destabilize American workplaces by ensnaring employers in unrelated 
labor disputes, disrupt the economy, and force individual Americans to pay union dues.233 The 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce has promoted anti-union propaganda since the 1930s and supported 
anti-worker laws such as the Taft-Hartley Act, and as such, would obviously oppose new 
legislation canceling out their decades of dominance.234 The National Retail Federation (NRF) is 
also against the PRO Act for many of the same reasons that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is. 
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Specifically, the NRF is worried about strikes harming corporate profit and the end to RTW 
laws.235 
 There is staunch opposition to the PRO Act. RTW laws are a critical tool for pro-business 
capitalists in the fight against labor. Organized labor has taken a political back seat for decades 
since RTW laws gradually decimated their numbers. The Taft-Hartley Act has supported RTW laws 
at the Federal level. While the pro-business community will not let the PRO Act pass easily, labor 
unions have already begun to apply pressure where they can. The AFL-CIO held a “digital day of 
action” on Instagram on April , , to call on Senators to vote on the PRO Act.236 Should the 
PRO Act pass, the American ruling class will lose one of their most historically impactful tools in 
the form of RTW laws. Without the RTW laws, labor unions across the United States will be 
injected with funds, members, and political enthusiasm, the likes of which have not been seen 
since the heyday of American labor unionism in the 1940s. 
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